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COMMENT
EPA's CERCLA Lender Liability Proposal:
Secured Creditors "Hit the Jackpot"
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1 in response to

growing concerns about environmental and public health hazards caused
by improper hazardous waste disposal. 2 CERCLA is primarily designed

to relieve the burden on taxpayers by placing ultimate financial responsibility for hazardous waste clean-up on the parties improperly disposing
the chemical poisons. 3 CERCLA authorizes the federal government,
through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to clean up hazardous waste
sites4 and recover costs from specified categories of responsible
5
parties.

Potentially responsible parties include: 1) current owners or operators of hazardous waste facilities; 2) owners or operators of hazardous

waste facilities at the time of the hazardous waste disposal; 3) hazardous
waste generators who arranged for treatment or disposal of their waste at
the facilities; and 4) transporters who carried hazardous substances to the
facilities. 6 To successfully recover clean-up costs from a commercial lender

under CERCLA, the government must establish that: a) the lender falls
within one of the previously described categories of liable parties; b) a
release or threatened release of hazardous substances exists at the site; and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 R Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986). The
House Report described the goals of H.R. 7020, which eventually became the CERCLA statute, as:
an inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites in a systematic manner, establish-

ment of priorities among the sites based on relative danger, a response program to
contain dangerous releases from inactive hazardous wastes sites, acceleration of the
elimination of unsafe hazardous waste sites, and a systematic program of funding
to identify, evaluate and take responsive actions at inactive hazardous waste sites to
assure protection of public health and the environment in a cost-effective manner.
H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6128.
3. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,1553 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 911
F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1991).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
6. Id.
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incurred clean-up costs in response to the release
c) the United States has
7
or threatened release.
An owner or operator of a facility containing hazardous wastes is
strictly liable 8 to the United States government for costs incurred in
responding to environmental and health hazards posed by that facility's
waste. 9 However, the statutory definition of "owner or operator" does not
include "a person, who, without participating in the management of a...
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the... facility." 10 This provision of CERCLA is commonly referred
to as "the secured creditor exemption"11 and it, along with the terms
"owner" and "operator," have caused courts significant difficulty in
determining the existence or extent of lender liability. The factors principally responsible for courts' confusion are the statute's scant legislative
1
history 12 and its abundance of technical errors and ambiguities. 3
In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit examined the secured creditor
exemption in United States v. Fleet Factors14 and its decision sent shock
waves throughout the banking industry. In a bold departure from the conservative approaches to the secured creditor exemption used in prior case
law,15 the Fleet Factorscourt replaced the day-to-day participation in management standard with one that greatly increased lenders' potential liability. According to the Eleventh Circuit court, a secured creditor would be
subject to CERCLA liability, even without involvement in a facility's dayto-day operations, if it participated in the financial management "to a
a capacity to influence the [facility's] treatment of hazarddegree indicating
16
ous wastes."
The lending community's concern about the far-reaching effects
of the Fleet Factors standard was exacerbated by the subsequent wide7. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955,959 (S. D. Ga. 1988).
8. Liability is also joint and several under CERCLA unless the harm is reasonably divisible. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F2d 160,171 (4th Cir. 1988).
9. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1554.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
11. Fleet Factors, 901 F2d at 1556.
12. "[CERCLAI was hastily, and, therefore, inadequately drafted. Even the legislative history must be read with caution since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little
or no explanation." United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
13. Representative Broyhill of North Carolina offered a three-page list of defects and technical errors contained in H.R. 7020:
This bill was hurriedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as the
result contains a large but unknown number of drafting errors. In just one night of
review, legislative counsel has identified more than 45 technical errors alone. No
one is certain how many other technical errors and internal inconsistencies, not to
mention substantive deficiencies, may be discovered under closer scrutiny.
126 Cong. Rec. H31,969 (statement of Rep. Broyhill). "It is well known that CERCLA was
hastily drafted and adopted, with resulting ambiguities." Coastal Casting Service, Inc. v.
Aron, No. H-86-4463, 1988 WL 35012, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 1988).
14. 901 F,2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
15. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 4,1985);
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 . Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
16. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added).
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spread failure of savings and loan institutions. 17 Lenders became increasingly reluctant to fund potentially hazardous sites and thereby risk
incurring CERCLA liability 18 In an attempt to assuage lenders' fears and
provide a "safe harbor" for lending institutions' activities, the EPA drafted
a comprehensive interpretive rule to clarify the secured creditor exemption.19 The EPA's proposed rule offers detailed guidelines specifyiftg the
degree to which a lender may participate in management without becoming subject to CERCLA liability. The proposal also outlines the activities
lenders may safely undertake to protect a security interest. The most
recent draft of the EPA's proposal was signed June 5, 1991.20
This Comment examines the EPA's proposed interpretive rule on
the CERCLA secured creditor exemption. The first part providds an historical and analytical examination of the development of CERCLA lender
liability case law. The second section analyzes the EPA's proposal focusing
on the draft rule's treatment of the lender liability issues in the case law
and compliance with CERCLA's remedial goals. This Comment concludes
that the EPA's draft rule is so deferential toward lenders that it undermines Congress' purpose of shifting the burden of clean-up costs from
taxpayers to responsible parties. The EPA's maneuvering around the policy underlying CERCLA indicates that the secured creditor exemption
quandary is best answered by legislative, rather than administrative,
action.
BACKGROUND SUMMARY OF THE CASE LAW
The wide variety of analytical approaches used by courts grappling with the lender liability issue, and the resulting potpourri of standards, suggest judicial uneasiness with existing CERCLA lender liability
law. The following historical examination of the case law illustrates the
judiciary's dilemma and demonstrates the need for immediate legislative
clarification of the secured creditor exemption.
21
A. United States v. Mirabile
The circumstances under which CERCLA liability may be
imposed on lenders that have financed the owner or operator of an alleged
hazardous waste site were first directly addressed in United States v. Mirabile.22 In Mirabile, the EPA brought an action against Anna and Thomas
23
Mirabile, the current owners of the Turco paint manufacturing facility.
17. See infra p. 245 and note 121.
18. See infra p. 246 and note 122.
19. Lender Liability, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 5, 1991).
20. Id.
21. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,1985).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 20,995.
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American Bank and Trust Company (ABT) had previously foreclosed on
the bankrupt facility, purchased the facility as highest bidder at the sheriff's sale, and subsequently assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who accepted
a deed to the property. The Mirabiles joined ABT and Mellon Bank (East)
National Association (Mellon) as third-party defendants in the EPA suit.
ABT and Mellon counterclaimed against the United States alleging Small
Business Administration
(SBA) involvement in creating the hazardous
24
conditions at the site.
The critical issue in Mirabilewas whether the third-party defendants were subject to CERCLA liability as owners or operators of the facility during the time hazardous wastes were disposed. In determining the
kinds of activities in which lenders could engage, the court stated that
"the participation which is critical is participation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities. Mere financial ability to control waste
disposal practices of the sort possessed by the secured creditors in this
case is not sufficient for the imposition of liability."26 Moreover, Mirabile
asserted that before a secured creditor may be held liable as an operator,
"it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects
of the site." 27 The court applied this "day-to-day participation" standard
to the activities of all defendants in considering their respective motions
for summary judgment.
1) ABT
The district court first examined ABT's involvement with the
paint manufacturing facility. During the four-month period between foreclosure on the site and assignment of its bid to the Mirabiles, ABT boarded
up windows and changed locks to protect against vandalism, made
inquiries regarding the cost of disposing of various drums at the facility,
28
and showed the property on several occasions to prospective buyers.
While sidestepping the issue of whether the successful bid at the
sheriff's sale technically vested ABT with ownership, the court focused its
analysis on ABT's potential liability as an "operator."2 9 Noting that an
"operator" did not include persons who, without participating in the
management of a facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect
security interests, 30 the court stated that ABT's activities were insufficient
to constitute participation in the management of the site. The Mirabile
court further reasoned that ABT's foreclosure and subsequent supervision
of the property were consistent with protecting its security interest and
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,995 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988)).
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therefore did not preclude immunity under the secured creditor exempthe district court granted ABT's motion for summary
tion. Consequently,
31
judgment.
2) SBA
SBA's motion for summary judgment was similarly "compelling." 32 The SBA never took legal or equitable title to the site so any liabil33
ity imposed on it also had to arise from SBA's status as an "operator."
The Mirabiles based their claim3 4 on SBA's loan agreement which contained terms that could be construed as allowing SBA participation in
day-to-day management, including placing restrictions on Turco's
finances. However, although permitted by terms of the agreement, no
such involvement actually occurred. Therefore, the court dismissed the
Mirabiles' argument by asserting that "participation in purely financial
is [insufficient] to
aspects of operation, of the sort which occurred here,
35
bring a lender within the scope of CERCLA liability"
3) Mellon Bank
36
Mellon Bank's motion presented a "cloudier situation."
Although the court considered Mellon Bank loan officer Brett Sauers'
financial advice to the Turco Advisory Board insufficient involvement to
find Mellon liable as an "operator," it expressed concern about loan officer
Peter McWilliams' post-bankruptcy oversight of the company. McWilliams visited the plant regularly and determined the sequence in which
orders were filled. McWilliams also insisted on certain manufacturing
changes and reassignment of personnel. While conceding that McWilliams' conduct was a slender reed upon which to impose liability,37 the
court nevertheless held that a genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding Mellon's potential liability under CERCLA for participation in
the management of the facility, and the motion for summary judgment
was denied. 38
Two areas of concern arise from the Mirabiledecision. First, the
court generated an unworkable standard that was unacceptably lenient
toward lenders and frustrated CERCLA's remedial goals. "By allowing
31. Id. at 20,996.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 20,997.
34. In bringing their action against the SBA, ABT and Mellon argued that if their activities
at the site provided a basis for liability, then SBA's activities provided an equally, if not more,
compelling basis for liability. Therefore, the opposition to all three motions for summary
judgment came from the Mirabiles even though they had not asserted a direct claim against
the SBA. Id. at 20,995.
35. Id. at 20,997.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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lenders that acquire secured property through foreclosure to claim the
exemption so long as they have not participated in the site's daily operations, Mirabile ensured that lenders would rarely be held liable for costs
associated with environmental cleanup." 3 9 The broad liability escape
hatch carved out for lenders by the Mirabilecourt's narrow rule potentially
creates a whole new group of abandoned sites for which no responsible
party can be found. An increase in the number of orphan sites would significantly hamstring Congress' goal of relieving taxpayers of the overwhelming financial burden of cleaning up the nation's environmentally
contaminated areas. 40 Therefore, Mirabile's"participation in day-to-day
operations" standard raised a formidable protective barrier around
secured creditors that was at odds with the apparent legislative intent of
CERCLA.
Secondly, the Mirabile court created confusion by examining the
lenders' liability under the secured creditor exemption as "operators"
instead of first addressing whether the lenders held indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest.4 1 Although the outcome in Mirabile
would likely have been the same under either approach, the court's application of the secured creditor exemption to "operators" creates the erroneous impression that the exemption equally affects both "owners" and
"operators." Common sense suggests that the exemption was intended to
protect secured creditors as "owners" from incurring liability based solely
on holding indicia of ownership in a contaminated facility. This view is
supported by CERCLA's legislative history.42 However, Congress wanted
to prevent secured creditors who essentially operated a facility from
shielding themselves from liability behind the exemption. Therefore, it
qualified the exemption by excluding lenders who participate in management from immunity.43 Consequently, the correct analysis involves two
steps: 1) determining whether the lender "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect [its] security interest;" 44 and, if so, then; 2) determining
39. Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security
Interest Exemption, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1249,1255 (1991).
40. Id.
41. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
42. ["Owner"] does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as
a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel
or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing
arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules, or regulations.
H.R. Rep. No. 172,96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160,
6181.
43. See G. Anhang, Note, Cleaning Up the Lender Management ParticipationStandard Under
CERCLA in the Aftermath of Fleet Factors, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 235, 252-53 (1991) (secured
creditor exemption designed to exclude lenders from liability as "owners" rather than "operators"); G. A. Perkins, Comment, Lender Liability Under CERCLA Deserves More Than A Fleeting Glance, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 209,238 (1991) (common sense suggests that exemption
intended to protect lenders from liability merely for holding a security interest in contaminated property but does not cover lenders who participate in management).
44. 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(20)(A).
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whether the lender is subject to liability for "participating in the management of... [the] facility."45 Mirabile essentially served to get lender liability analysis under the secured creditor exemption off on the wrong foot by
creating a standard that was too deferential to lenders while using an
incorrect analytical approach in the process.
B. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company

46

The court interpreted the lender's situation much differently in
Maryland Bank & Trust Company. Maryland Bank & Trust (MB & T) foreclosed on a trash and garbage site at which heavy metals and hazardous
organics such as toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes had been dumped.47
MB & T subsequently purchased the property at auction; however, unlike
the lender in Mirabile,MB & T retained title to the site for the next several
years. During that time period, the EPA discovered the environmental
hazards at the dump and proceeded to clean up the site itself-removing
two hundred thirty-seven drums containing chemicals and 1180 tons of
contaminated soil, at a cost of approximately $550,000.48
MB & T argued that it was exempt from CERCLA liability as a
former mortgagee who acquired title through purchase at a foreclosure
sale even though it might be a "person" who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at the site.49 It was undisputed that MB & T had
owned the facility since 1982. The parties disagreed about whether MB &
T had been the "operator" of the facility since that time. The court stated
that the dispute over the term "operator" was not determinative and that
current ownership of a site was enough to bring a party within the ambit
of section [9607(a)(1)1. 50 "Notwithstanding the language 'the owner and
be both an owner and operator to incur liability
operator', a party need not
51
under this subsection."
Limiting its analysis to MB & T's liability as an "owner," the court
concluded that MB & T "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not
to protect its security interest, but to protect its investment."5 2 MB & T's
53
holding the property for nearly four years swayed the court's decision.
The court determined that the lender held indicia of ownership primarily
to protect its security interest only during the life of the mortgage. "The
45. Id.
46. 632 F.Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
47. Id. at 575-76.
48. Id. at 576.
49. Id. at 577.
50. Id.Section 9607(a) prescribes liable parties and includes "(1) the owner and operator of
a vessel or a facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
51. MarylandBank, 632 F. Supp. at 577 (emphasis added). The court based this conclusion
on legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,6182, and prior case law, State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578.
52. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
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exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding title
after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here,
the former mortgagee has held title for nearly four years, and a full year
before the EPA clean-up."5 4 Because the secured creditor exemption did
not afford protection for lenders acquiring property to protect investments, MB & T was held liable as an "owner" of the facility and its motion
for summary judgment was denied.55
The principle source of controversy from Maryland Bank is the
court's narrow construction of the secured creditor exemption that
imposes "owner" liability on lenders purchasing contaminated property
at a foreclosure sale.5 6 Critics argue that acquiring property at a foreclo54. Id.

55. Id. at 582.
56. Id. at 579. The MarylandBank court's rationale for holding lenders liable as owners after
purchasing secured property at a foreclosure sale rests on shaky ground for two reasons.
First, while examining the meaning of the definite article "the" in "the owner and operator"
from § 9607(a)(1), the court stated that CERCLA was a "hastily patched together compromise
Act," and "not a model of statutory clarity." Id. at 578. Therefore, the court reasoned that,
[because] Congress does [not] always follow the rules of grammar when enacting the laws of this nation... to slavishly follow the laws of grammar while interpreting acts of Congress would violate sound canons of statutory interpretation
(citations omitted). Misuse of the definite article is hardly surprising in a hastily
conceived compromise statute such as CERCLA, since members of Congress might
well have had no time to dot all the i's or cross all the t's.
Id. Yet later in the opinion, while examining the scope of the secured creditor exemption, the
Maryland Bank court engaged in the very same exercise in semantics it had criticized earlier.
In determining that the security interest must exist at the time of the clean-up for a lender to
claim immunity from liability, the court noted that "Itihe exemption of subsection
[9601](20)(A) covers only those persons who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the land. The verb tense of the exclusionary
language is critical." Id. at 579 (emphasis added). The court talked out of both comers of its
mouth to arrive at that conclusion.
Additionally, the MarylandBank court relied on scant legislative history to further narrow
its construction of the secured creditor exemption in stating that the exemption was designed
only to protect lenders located in 13 states, Maryland included, governed by common law
mortgage title theory since lenders in these few states "actually [hold] title to the property
while the mortgage is in force." Id. The district court noted that the first draft of the Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, at 474, 480 (1983), one of the four major bills giving rise to
CERCLA, contained an "owner" exemption similar to that found in CERCLA. Id. House
Report 85 was accompanied by House Repbrt 172 in which the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries explained that "owner" does not include persons "who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure
a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking
laws, rules or regulations." Id.at 579-80 (citing H.R. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1979),
reprintedin 2 A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, at 525,546 (1983) (emphasis added)). Based on this language,
the court concluded that "Congress intended [the secured creditor exemption] to exclude...
common law title mortgagees from the definition of 'owner' since title was in their hands
only by operation of the common law." Id. at 579. The Maryland Bank court's connection
between the cited legislative history and common law mortgage title theory is interesting;
however, it is the only decision to date to have established that nexus and used it to analyze
the secured creditor exemption's scope. Consequently, the rationale underlying the court's
narrow construction of the exemption is questionable.
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sure sale should not expose lenders to liability because such activity is
consistent with protecting a security interest.57 "Neither the statute nor its
legislative history supports the theory that protection under the secured
creditor exemption magically disappears at the moment the lender-mortgagee becomes the lender-owner. " In contrast, supporters of Maryland
Bank contend that CERCLA's legislative history and statutory language
suggest the opposite conclusion, 9 and that "[1]enders protect their security interests by obtaining mortgages at the outset, not by acquiring
secured property through foreclosure .... A lender's decision to foreclose
is therefore not in itself determinative of liability; however, if the lender
the property, it exposes itself to liability as an
subsequently " Furchases
0
actual owner.
The Maryland Bank court could have found the lender liable by
concentrating on why, not when the creditor purchased the property. In
fact, the court concluded that MB & T purchased the property not to protect its security interest, but to protect its investment. 6 1 That conclusion
alone was sufficient to impose liability on MB & T and could be easily reconciled with Mirabile.62 Therefore, Maryland Bank unnecessarily established an inflexible standard of holding all lenders who purchase secured
property at foreclosure liable as owners.
63
C. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., Inc.
The Guidice v. BFG Electroplatingand Mfg. Co., Inc. court used a
"hybrid" approach of the Mirabile and Maryland Bank analyses in examining lender liability under CERCLA. Borough residents brought an action
against BFG, the owner of a metal polishing company, for environmental
contamination and recovery of response costs. 64 BFG filed a third-party
complaint against the National Bank of the Commonwealth (Bank), which
had held record title to the property for eight months following foreclo6
sure.
The Guidice court separated its analysis of the Bank's liability into
two parts. It reviewed the Bank's involvement with the facility: a) as an
"operator" prior to taking title, applying Mirabile; and b) as an "owner"

57. Note, supranote 39, at 1262.
58, T. R. Zinnecker, Lender Liability Under CERCLA and the Fleet-ing Protectionof the Secured
CreditorExemption, 44 Sw. L.J. 1449,1463 (1991).
59. Note, supranote 39, at 1262.
60. Note, supranote 39, at 1262-63.
61. United States v. Maryland Bank, 632 R Supp. 573,579 (D. Md. 1986) (MB & T held title to
the property for nearly four years, and a full-year before the EPA clean-up).
62. In Mirabile,the lender who purchased the property at the sheriff's sale held title for
only four months before assigning its bid to the Mirabiles and was not held liable as an owner.
United States v. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994,20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,1985).

63. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
64. id. at 557.
65. Id. The Bank purchased the property at a sheriff's sale on April 16, 1982. Id. at 559.
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after taking title, applying the post-foreclosure purchase standard from
Maryland Bank.
1) The Bank as an Operator
Considering the Bank's liability as an operator, the court
addressed whether the Bank went beyond protecting its security interest
66
and actually participated in the management or control of the facility.
Even though the Bank renegotiated the loan terms several times, met with
facility officials to discuss the status of accounts, personnel changes, and
presence of raw materials, and conducted on-site inspections, Guidice
held: "these activities prior to foreclosure [are] insufficient to void the
[secured creditor] exemption of CERCLA. There is no evidence suggesting
that the Bank controlled operational, production, or waste disposal activities at the [property]. 6 7 Additionally, the court stated that the Bank's
actions prior to its purchasing the facility at the foreclosure sale were
"prudent measures undertaken to protect its security interest in the property."68 Therefore, the Bank was not liable as an "operator."
2) The Bank as an Owner
The Bank fared less favorably under the court's "owner" analysis.
In contrast to Mirabile,but consistent with Maryland Bank, Guidice held the
National Bank of the Commonwealth responsible for hazardous waste
disposal activities during the eight-month period that it held title to the
property.69 The court supported its decision by citing an amendment to
CERCLA that excluded from liability state or local governments that
acquired " 'ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax
delinquency, abandonment' or similar means." 7 0 The Guidice court concluded that the absence of an exemption for lenders who acquire property
through foreclosure from the amendment indicated congressional intent
to hold them liable as owners. 71 Consequently, although it relied on different legislative history, Guidice endorsed MarylandBank's standard of holding lenders who purchase contaminated property after foreclosure liable
as "owners," and unequivocally extended that standard to include creditors who hold title only for short periods of time.
72
D. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
The first federal appellate court to address the construction of the

66. Id. at 561.
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (West Supp. 1989)).
71. Id.

72. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
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secured creditor exemption, United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp.,73 produced
surprising and controversial results. In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation
(Fleet) entered into an agreement to advance funds against accounts
receivable with Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a cloth printing facility.
Fleet also obtained a security interest in SPW's textile
facility, equipment,
74
inventory and fixtures as collateral for the loan.
In 1979, SPW filed for bankruptcy and in early 1981, Fleet stopped
advancing funds to SPW because SPW's debt to Fleet was more than the
estimated value of its accounts receivable. 75 In May 1982, Fleet foreclosed
on its security interest in SPW's inventory and equipment. Fleet also contracted with Baldwin Industrial Liquidators (Baldwin) to auction off the
collateral, and with Nix Riggers, a salvage operation, to remove any
unsold equipment in consideration for leaving the premises "broom
76
clean."
On January 20, 1984, the EPA inspected the facility and discovered
drums containing toxic chemicals and 44 truckloads of asbestos material.
The EPA incurred clean-up costs of nearly $400,000. 77 Because SPW failed
to pay state and county taxes, the facility was conveyed to Emanuel
County, Georgia, at a foreclosure sale on July 7, 1987.78
The government brought an action to recover response costs from
Fleet as a current owner or operator of the facility and as an owner or
operator of the facility at the time hazardous wastes were disposed. 79 The
district court denied both the government's and Fleet's motions for summary judgment regarding Fleet's liability and certified the summary judgment issues for interlocutory appeal. 80 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed; however, it replaced the lower court's standard for "participating in the management" with one that was much less permissive toward
81
lenders.
1) Fleet's Liability Under Section 9607(a)(1)
Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit court held that Fleet
was not liable as a current owner or operator of the facility. The current
owner or operator of a facility is "that individual or entity owning or operating the facility at the time the plaintiff initiated the lawsuit by filing a
complaint." 82 The owner of the site at the time the EPA filed suit was
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1556.
United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., 724 . Supp. 955,957 (S. D. Ga. 1988).
Id. at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 959-60.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 962-63.
United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 E2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1554.
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Emanuel County, Georgia. However, CERCLA provides that a state or
local government that has involuntarily acquired title to a site is usually
not held liable. 83 Rather, the owner or operator under such circumstances
is "any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at
such facility immediately beforehand."84
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the government's argument that
"immediately beforehand" referred liability back to the last party to actually own or manage the facility and, instead, construed the phrase to mean
"without intervening ownership, operation, and control."85 The court
noted that "[a]lthough a trustee can obviously abdicate its control over a
bankrupt estate, it cannot in such a manner unilaterally delegate its
responsibility to a previous controlling entity."86 Because Fleet's involvement with SPW terminated more than three years before the county
assumed ownership of the facility, the court stated that "to impose liability
[on Fleet as a current owner or operator] would torture the plain statutory
meaning of 'immediately beforehand'."87
2) Fleets Liability Under Section 9607(a)(2)
The circuit court next turned its attention toward Fleet's liability
as an owner or operator of the facility at the time the release of hazardous
substances occurred. The court recognized two distinct ways of imposing
liability under section 9607(a)(2). Fleet would be liable if it operated the
facility or, alternatively, if it held indicia of ownership in SPW and managed the facility to the extent necessary to remove it from the secured
creditor exemption. 88 Since it was undisputed that Fleet held indicia of
ownership in the facility primarily to protect its security interest, the critical issue was whether Fleet participated
in the management enough to
89
preclude immunity under the statute.
Finding the district court's construction of the secured creditor
exemption too permissive toward lenders, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a
broader standard for imposing liability. Under the new standard,
a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability,
without being an operator, by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured
83. Id. at 1555. The exemption from liability for state or local governments that involuntarily acquire title to contaminated property is found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).

84. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988) (emphasis added).
85. Fleet Factors,901 F.2d at 1555.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1556 n.6. The court stated that the facts alleged by the government were sufficient
to impose liability under either analysis, but decided to forego consideration of Fleet's liability as an operator because the case fit "more snugly" under a secured creditor analysis. Id.
89. Id. at 1556.
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creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day
operations of the facility in order to be liablealthough such conduct will certainly lead to the loss of
the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste. Rather,
a secured creditorwill be liable if its involvement with the
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support
the inference that it could
affect hazardous waste disposal
90
decisions if it so chose.
After SPW ceased operations at the plant in February 1987, Fleet

allegedly required SPW to seek its approval before it shipped goods to
customers and determined when and to whom goods should be sent. The
government claimed that Fleet also set prices for excess inventory, decided
when to lay-off employees, processed SPW's employment and tax forms,
and supervised the office administrator's activities. The circuit court
stated that these facts, if proved true, would show that "Fleet's involvement in the financial management of the facility was pervasive, if not complete," and would remove Fleet from the protection of the secured creditor
91
exemption.
Fleet was also held potentially liable for its activities at the facility
after contracting with Baldwin to auction off collateral in May 1982, until
Nix Riggers, the salvage operation, left the facility in December 1983.92
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Fleet's assertion that its activities at the
site were undertaken merely to protect its security interest in the facility,
equipment, inventory and fixtures as "immaterial," and stated that "[tihe
scope of the secured creditor exemption is not determined by whether the
creditor's activity was taken to protect its security interest. What is relevant is the nature and extent of the creditor's involvement with the facil93
ity, not its motive."
The Fleet Factors court's casual dismissal of the nexus between
motive and action seems somewhat counterintuitive to the whole purpose
of having a secured creditor exemption. Because only secured creditors
who hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest fall
within the penumbra of the exemption, motive seems to be an inseparable
aspect of the analysis. Rather than discard motive entirely, the Fleet Factors
court could have more easily found Fleet liable for holding indicia of own90. Id. at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 1559.
92. Id. at 1560. The plaintiff alleged that Fleet allowed Baldwin to move barrels containing
hazardous substances around before conducting the auction, that buyers were allowed to
remove the machinery and equipment they had purchased, and that Fleet gave Nix Riggers
access to the facility for 180 days to remove remaining machinery and equipment. Plaintiff
contended that all this activity knocked friable asbestos loose, and that the chemicals and
asbestos in the facility posed an immediate risk to public health and the environment. Id. at
1560 n.14.
93. Id. at 1560.
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ership for investment purposes consistent with the reasoning of Maryland
Bank. 4
The decision in Fleet Factorspropelled the secured creditor exemption into the CERCLA spotlight. The flurry of criticism centered on the
court's determination that a lender may subject itself to liability under two
distinct "operator" thresholds. According to FleetFactors,"[allthough similar, the phrase 'participating in the management' and the term 'operator'
are not congruent." 95 Therefore, a lender may incur liability either as an
"operator" or, alternatively, without being an operator, "by participating
in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicatin a capacity
to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes."
Under the Fleet Factorsstandard, a lender is more vulnerable than
a nonlender because less involvement with management, if any, is
required to incur "operator" liability. In fact, a secured creditor would be
liable based only on the inference drawn from its financial management
activity indicating "that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions
if it so chose."9 7 It is hard to imagine a scenario in which a secured creditor
does not have potential to at least indirectly affect the handling of hazardous waste simply by virtue of having financed a facility's operation. The
"exemption" then becomes a sword to be used against lenders rather than
a shield to protect them from liability. Moreover, the Fleet Factorscourt
unnecessarily created its sweeping standard. The circuit court admitted
that the lender's alleged management9 8activities were sufficient to impose
liability upon it as a facility operator.
99
E. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.
Just a few months after Fleet Factors, another federal appellate
court considered the scope of CERCLA lender liability. The Ninth Circuit
used a "participation in the management" analysis that somewhat dampened the effects of Fleet Factors' expansive standard while affirming summary judgment in the third party defendant's favor. The third party
defendant in Bergsoe was the Port of St. Helens (Port), a municipal corporation organized under Oregon law and vested with the power to issue
revenue bonds to promote industrial development in the St. Helens
area. 100 In 1978, the Port sold 50 acres of land to the Bergsoe Metals (Bergsoe) corporation for the building of a lead recycling facility. The Port
101
received a $400,000 promissory note and a mortgage on the property.

94. United States v Maryland Bank, 632 F Supp. 573,579 (D. Md. 1986).
95. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1558.
98. Id. at 1556 n.6.
99. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 669.
101. Id. at 669-70.
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By June 1981, Bergsoe, the Port, and the United States National
Bank of Oregon (Bank) completed the bond financing for the recycling
operation. Bergsoe conveyed the 50 acres and the plant to the Port by warranty deed, then entered into two leases with the Port to cover the property and plant. The Port mortgaged the property and the plant to the Bank
to secure its bond obligations, and assigned to the Bank all of its rights
under, and revenues generated from, the two leases. Pursuant to the
agreement, Bergsoe made its lease payments to the Bank. 10 2
The Bergsoe recycling plant experienced financial problems
shortly after it began operations in 1982, and was declared in default on
the leases by the Bank in September of 1983. The Bank and Bergsoe
reached a workout agreement whereby Front Street Management Corporation (Front Street) would manage the plant and, in exchange, the Bank
103
and the Port would not foreclose under the leases or bond indentures.
The recycling facility suffered financial difficulties under Front
Street's management as well, and the plant eventually shut down in 1986.
The Bank put Bergsoe into involuntary bankruptcy in October of that year,
but by that time the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality had
already discovered hazardous substance contamination at the site. In September 1987, the Bank and the bankruptcy trustee filed suit against EAC,
Bergsoe's parent companies, to collect on Bergsoe's debts. The plaintiffs
additionally sought a declaratory judgment holding EAC liable for the
costs of cleaning up the environmental contamination. 1°4
EAC fied a third party complaint against the Port claiming that it
was liable for clean-up costs under CERCLA. The Port moved for summary judgment asserting that it did not qualify as an owner for CERCLA
purposes. The bankruptcy court granted the motion and the district court
affirmed. 105 The appellate court stated that, in order for the Port to win on
summary judgment, it needed to demonstrate both that it held indicia of
ownership primarily to protect its security
interest, and that it did not par106
ticipate in the management of the plant.
1) Security Interest
Holding paper title to the plant alone did not make the Port an
owner of the facility under CERCLA. 10 7 In contrast to the Fleet Factors
"motive is irrelevant" assertion, 10 8 the Bergsoe court emphasized that, for

102. Id. at 670.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id. at 671.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 F.2d 1550,1560 (11th Cir. 1990).
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purposes of the secured creditor exemption, it was critical to determine
why the Port held indicia of ownership. 1°9
The EAC pointed to the Port's lease agreements with Bergsoe as
evidence that the Port held indicia of ownership for investment purposes
rather than for protecting a security interest. Although the leases granted
the deeds to the property to the Port and each was described as a "lease"
rather than a "security agreement," the circuit court noted that the terms
of the leases gave all other traditional indicia of ownership to Bergsoe,
110
including the risk of loss from destruction or damage to the property.
The court further stated that the repayment terms under the leases were
an even better indication of how far removed the Port was from ownership."1 The Bergsoe court decided that the Port's indicia of ownership was
held primarily to protect a security interest.11 2 Therefore, it was not subject to liability as an "owner."
2) Participation in Management
The second hurdle of the secured creditor exemption test
involved determining whether the Port was subject to "operator" liability
for participating in the management of the Bergsoe recycling facility. EAC
argued that the Port had participated in management by negotiating and
encouraging the building of the Bergsoe plant. The court responded that
"[i]f this 3were 'management,' no secured creditor would ever be pro11
tected.
Similarly, when EAC pointed to certain rights the Port had under
the leases as evidence of management, particularly the right to inspect the
premises and to reenter and take possession upon foreclosure, the court
stated that nearly all secured creditors have these rights. Focusing on the
active "participating in the management" language from the CERCLA
secured creditor exemption, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the critical
issue was not what rights the Port had, but rather, what it did. Therefore,
"[riegardless of what rights the Port may have had, it [could not] have
114
participated in management if it never exercised them."
Finally, the EAC argued that the Port became subject to "operator" liability by giving Front Street control of the plant through the 1984
workout agreement. However, EAC failed to produce evidence of any
negotiations between them. The decision to hire Front Street was entered
109. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Id.
111. Bergsoe's "rent" exactly equaled the principal and interest due under the bonds and
was paid directly to the Bank as the bondholder trustee. Furthermore, the leases expired
when the money owed under the bonds was paid off, not on a specific date. Finally, when
the bonds were paid off, Bergsoe had the option of purchasing title to the property for the
nominal sum of $100. Id.
112. Id. at 671-72.
113. Id. at 672.
114. Id. at 672-73.
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into only by the Bank and Bergsoe. 115 Therefore, the Port was not implicated by any workout agreement involving Front Street.
Although it cited the rule regarding participation in management
adopted in Fleet Factors,the Bergsoe court did not use it in its analysis and
avoided establishing a rule of its own. Instead, the court stated that "whatever the precise parameters of 'participation,' there must be some actual
management of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the
[exemption]. Here
there was none, and we therefore need not engage in
116
line drawing."
In re Bergsoe came closer to hitting the proverbial "nail on the
head" 117 in its secured creditor exemption analysis than any of the previous decisions. The Ninth Circuit properly applied the exemption to an
"owner," and noted that two conditions must be met for lender immunity
from liability. First, the creditor must hold indicia of ownership primarily
to protect its security interest; and
second, the lender must not participate
118
in the management of the plant.
Although the Bergsoe court correctly organized its examination of
the issue, its opinion offered little in the way of defining parameters for
meeting the above criteria. The lender in question was merely the "middle-man" in a "lease-back" agreement, so its financial ties to the facility
wer extremely attenuated and clearly served to protect its security interest.119 The Bergsoe court did present an alternative to the broad capacity to
influence standard from Fleet Factors by stating that some actual facility
management is required to impose lender liability. However, because
there was no lender management activity in this case, the court did not
"engage in line drawing." 0 Therefore, though the Bergsoe decision outlined the correct analytical approach for examining lender liability, it shed
little new light on navigating the murky waters of the secured creditor
exemption by leaving the toughest and most controversial questions
largely unanswered.
EPA PROPOSAL TO LIMIT LENDER LIABILITY
Concern among creditors regarding lender liability under the
confusing court decisions escalated in the wake of widespread failure of
savings and loan institutions.1 2 1 Consequently, the lending community
115. Id.
116. Id. at 672.
117. The "nail" in this instance being the meaning of, and relationship between, "owner,"
"operator," the secured creditor exemption, and "participating in the management."
118. In re Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 671.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 672.
121. EPA Official Tells House Panelof Shift in Policy Toward Lenders, CERCLA Liability, Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 756 (Aug. 10, 1990) [hereinafter CERCLA Liability].
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has become increasingly wary of funding potentially hazardous sites.
According to Associated Builders and Contractors Inc. (Associated Builders), an industry group supporting administrative action to expand lender
protection from CERCLA liability, "an 'environmentally driven credit
crunch' has created significant problems for small businesses."122 Survey
data collected by the American Bankers Association (ABA) substantiates
Associated Builders' "credit crunch" claim. Eighty-eight percent of the
banks surveyed by the ABA have changed their lending procedures
recently in an attempt to avoid CERCLA liability. As a result, many businesses are now unable to secure financing for properties that pose envi123
ronmental risks.

Initially, the EPA was resistant to promulgating rule changes to
increase lender protection in response to the furor over Fleet Factors. The
EPA, however, announced a "policy reversal" to the House Energy and
Commerce Transportation and Hazardous Materials subcommittee on
August 2, 1990. James Strock, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, reported to the committee that "EPA supports the principle that
CERCLA liability needs to be as certain and predictable as possible and
should not inhibit financial transactions unnecessarily." 124 Additionally,
Strock announced that the goal of the EPA's efforts would be to interpret
the secured creditor exemption in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) in order to provide a " 'safe harbor" in which lenders could take responsible actions
without incurring CERCLA liability." 12 5 However, Strock emphasized
that any proposed rule must ensure "responsible behavior by lenders
when they initially lend funds and when they discover contamination
upon foreclosure." 126 The most recent draft of the EPA's proposal to limit
financial institution liability under CERCLA was signed June 5, 1991.127
The proposal must answer several pressing questions arising
from the case law to sufficiently address the secured creditor exemption
quandary.
1. Is the secured creditor exemption designed to protect "owners" or "operators" or both?
2. What activities constitute "participating in the management"
of a facility such that the lender acts outside the ambit of the
secured creditor exemption and becomes subject to CERCLA
liability?
122. A. Phillips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal for Bankers?, Env't Rep.
(BNA)
No. 22,1158,1160 (Aug. 23,1991).

123. Id.
124.
125.
126.
127.

CERCLA Liability, supra note 121.
CERCLA Liability, supra note 121.
CERCLA Liability, supra note 121.
Lender Liability, supra note 19.
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3. What activities are considered consistent with protecting a
security interest, and what activities suggest, instead, that
indicia of ownership is held primarily to protect an investment?
A. "Owner" or "Operator"?
Courts have approached the secured creditor exemption by sometimes analyzing its applicability to lenders as "operators,"128 and at other
times as "owners. "1 These disparate methods of reasoning have created

inconsistency and unpredictability regarding both the scope and target of
the exemption. Accordingly, any proposed interpretive rule needs to distinctly clarify who the exemption covers to prevent confusion and promote analytical uniformity in its application.
The secured creditor exemption applies to persons who "[hold]
indicia of ownership primarily to protect [a] security interest... ,."130 The
EPA's proposal defines "indicia of ownership" as "evidence of interests in
real or personal property held as security for a loan or other obligation,
including full title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents." 13 1 Additionally, the draft rule provides a
non-inclusive list of examples of indicia of ownership, such as "a mortgage, deed of trust, or legal title obtained pursuant to foreclosure ... ,or an
assignment, lien, pledge, or other right or other form of encumbrance
against property...

132

Furthermore, the proposed rule defines the holder of a security
interest, albeit in circular fashion, as "a person who holds indicia of ownership in a... facility to protect a security interest." 133 The EPA qualifies
its definition to include the initial holder of the security interest and any
successor-in-interest, including "a subsequent purchaseron the secondary
a security
market, loan guarantor or insurer, or other person who holds
134
interest under the applicable law governing the transaction."
The language in the proposal suggests that the secured creditor
exemption applies to "owners" and not "operators." It seems reasonable
to accord "owner" and "operator" their ordinary meanings for CERCLA
purposes because no wording exists to the contrary in the statute 135 and to
128. United States v. Mirabile,15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,1985);
Guidicev. BFG Electroplatingand Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F.Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
129. United States v. MarylandBank, 632 F.Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
131. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
132. Lender Liability, supranote 19, at 28,808.
133. Lender Liability, supranote 19, at 28,808.
134. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808 (emphasis added).
135. CERCLA simply defines an "owner or operator" as "any person owning or operating
[a] facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
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do so would be consistent with CERCLA's legislative history.136 "Owners" are typically thought of as persons associated with legal rights of possession often evidenced by titles, deeds, or liens against property, whereas
"operators" are commonly considered to be persons who control or manage. The EPA's definition of "indicia of ownership" is replete with terminology usually connected with an "owner", while any mention of
customary "operator" activities is noticeably absent.
Although the EPA's proposed rule falls short of creating an
express limitation, the rule's language strongly implies that the secured
creditor exemption covers only parties who are potentially liable as "owners" by virtue of holding indicia of ownership in contaminated property
Unfortunately, even a strong implication that the exemption does not protect "operators" may not sufficiently guide courts wrestling with secured
creditor exemption analysis. Therefore, while the EPA's proposal steers
the analysis in the right direction, it sputters and runs out of gas before
reaching the final destination-a precise answer. Accordingly, it remains
unclear, under the draft rule, exactly to whom, and how, the exemption
applies.
B. Participating in Management?
Regardless of whether a lender is labeled an "owner" or an "operator" for CERCLA liability analysis, the lender must not have participated
in the management of the facility to claim protection under the secured
creditor exemption. 13 7 Although courts have generated a variety of conflicting standards while attempting to define "participating in the management," the proverbial straw that broke the lender's back was the
"capacity to influence" standard1 38 developed in Fleet Factors.The EPA's
draft rule tackles the Fleet Factorscontroversy head-on by expressly rejecting the Fleet Factorsstandard and embracing the standard adopted by the
court in Mirabile.According to the EPA's proposal, "[plarticipation in the
actual participation in the management
management of a facility means ...
or operational affairs by the holder of the security interest, and does not
include the mere capacity,or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to
control facility operations. " 139 A secured creditor will be considered to

136. CERCLA's legislative history describes "owners" as "persons who hold title [or] possess some equivalent evidence of ownership," and "operators" as persons who are "carrying
out operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." H.R. Rep. No. 172,96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36-37 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160,6181-82.
137. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809.
138. United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 F.2d 1550,1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990).
139. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809 (emphasis added).
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participate in the management of a facility if, while the borroweris still in
possession, the lender:
[1]exercis[es] decisionmaking control over the borrower'senvironmental compliance, such that the security holder has
undertaken responsibility for the borrower's waste
disposal or hazardous substance handling practices
which results in a release or threatened release;or
[2]exercis[es] control at a management level encompassing the
borrower'senvironmental compliance responsibilities,comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such that the security holder has assumed or
manifested responsibility for the management of the
enterprise by establishing, implementing, or maintaining the policies and procedures encompassing the day-tocompliance decisionmaking of the enterday environmental
14 0
prise.

The EPA's interpretive rule adopts the narrowest "participating in
the management" standard generated in CERCLA lender liability case
law. Imposing liability for engaging in the activities circumscribed by that
standard, i.e., exercising decisionmaking control over hazardous waste
treatment that results in a release or threatened release and assuming
responsibility for a facility's day-to-day environmental compliance, is certainly consistent with CERCLA's goals.14 1 However, the problem with the
EPA's definition of "participating in the management" lies not with the
activities that are encompassed by the definition but with the activities
that are not.
The EPA's "participating in the management" standard is so limited that it allows lenders to engage in day-to-day management activities
in the name of protecting a security interest that would subject other
potentially responsible parties to "operator" liability. Under the proposal,
a lender may regularly monitor or inspect a site, provide financial support
and mana ement advice, and even impose conditions on the facility's
operation. 42 Moreover, the rule provides that the proscribed activities
will be considered "participating in the management" only if they occur
"while the borrower is still in possession" of the facility.143 This language
implies that a secured creditor may undertake those same activities after
foreclosure without subjecting itself to CERCLA liability as an "operator."

140. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809 (emphasis added).
141. H.R. Rep. No. 1016,96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 33 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119,6136.
142. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809.
143. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809.
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Allowing a secured creditor to participate in the management of a
facility for the limited purpose of protecting a security interest manifests
an intriguing philosophical shift on the part of the EPA. In its brief for the
United States as Appellee on Fleet Factors, the EPA argued that
the [secured creditor] exemption is available only to
[lenders] who do not participate in management of the
facility, not those who participate in management for
limited purposes, such as in order to protect [a] security interest.... [R]ead for its plain meaning, CERCLA's phrase "without participating" cannot be
"while participating only for limited
twisted to mean
144
purposes."
The proposal's broad protection of lender activities presents a
puzzling EPA policy reversal regarding the meaning of "participating in
the management" for purposes of the secured creditor exemption. The
proposed rule also fails to accomplish one of the major objectives outlined
by James Strock, the EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement.
According to Strock, any interpretive rule must ensure "responsible
behavior by lenders when they initially lend funds."145 Completely at
odds with that objective is the EPA's proposed rule which specifically provides that "[nleither the [CERCLA] statute nor this regulation require a
holder of a security interest to conduct an [environmental] inspection...
cannot be based on or
and the liability of a holder of a security interest
146
affected by a failure to conduct an inspection."
By not requiring that lenders perform an environmental inspection of a site before financing an operation, the EPA's draft rule undermines CERCLA's remedial goals. It permits lenders to avoid liability by
"unwittingly" funding environmentally hazardous sites. This provision
encourages creditors to adopt an "ignorance is bliss" approach to financing an operation rather than the "responsible behavior" described by
Strock.
One final weakness underlying this section of the proposal's reasoning is the EPA's "flip-flop" solution to the "participating in the management" controversy. The furor over Fleet Factors arose from the court's
creation of a two-pronged standard under which lenders were more vulnerable to liability as "operators" than other potentially responsible parties. 147 The problem with the Fleet Factorsstandard was that it subjected
lenders who participated in management to CERCLA liability under a
144. Brief for United States as Appellee at 40-41, United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F2d
1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-8094).

145. CERCLA Liability, supranote 121.
146. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809.
147. United States v. Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
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much lower threshold of management participation than would be
required for imposing liability on nonlenders. According to the EPA's
draft rule, the answer to this dilemma is simply the creation of a twopronged standard under which other parties are much more vulnerable to
"operator" liability than lenders. The EPA's extremely narrow definition
of "participating in the management" essentially tips the "operator" liability scales heavily in favor of secured creditors and against other potentially responsible parties. By subjecting nonlenders to CERCLA liability
under a lower management participation threshold than lenders, the
EPA's standard is just as unfair as the highly criticized standard from Fleet
Factors.
C. Security Interest or Investment?
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the EPA's draft rule is its
extremely deferential treatment towards secured creditors who foreclose
on and take title to contaminated property. Although the CERCLA statute
does not expressly prohibit holding indicia of ownership to protect an
investment, courts have reasoned that the exemption covers only lenders
14 8
holding indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest.
The EPA's proposal directly addresses this issue by precluding lenders
who hold indicia of ownership for investment purposes, or for purposes
other than protecting a security interest, from immunity under the exemption. 149 Consistent with Maryland Bank, the draft rule makes it unnistakably clear to lenders that the only statutorily protected motivation for
holding indicia of ownership is to protect a security interest.
The EPA's proposed rule defines "primarily to protect a security
interest" as holding indicia of ownership "for the purpose of securing
payment or performance of an obligation," 15 0 and qualifies Maryland
Bank's standard by outlining parameters within which lenders may act
when purchasing property at foreclosure without subjecting themselves
to liability as investors. Specifically, the draft rule provides that holding
indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest
148. United States v. Maryland Bank, 632 R Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986); In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp., 910 R2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1990).
149. Lender Liability, supra note 19,at 28,808.
150. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
Recognized transactions that may create security interests include mortgages,
certain types of liens, forms of conditional sales, installment sales, trust receipt
transactions, certain assignments, factoring agreements, or accounts receivable
financing arrangements, and some forms of leases or consignments, among others.
Whether a sale-and-leaseback, conditional sale, installment sales contract, or any
other transaction creates a security interest within the meaning of the [secured
creditor] exemption under CERCLA is determined by the facts of each case and
whether a security interest is created under applicable law.
Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
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may include full legal title acquired through foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale, acquisition or
assignment of title in lieu of foreclosure, acquisition of
a right to title, or other agreement in settlement of the
loan obligation, or any other formal or informal manner by which the security holder temporarily acquires,
for subsequent disposition, possession of the borrower's collateral, and are necessary
incidents to protec15 1
tion of the security interest.
However, lenders may not purchase property at foreclosure bT
1
bids from, parties offering "fair consideration"
outbidding, or refusing
1 53
for the property.
Other than this one limitation requiring acceptance of "fair consideration," the proposed rule is remarkably lenient toward lenders. A
creditor who did not participate in management prior to foreclosure may,
without voiding the secured creditor exemption,
foreclose, sell, liquidate, wind up operations, or retain
and continue functioning the enterprise in order to
protect the value of the secured asset prior to sale as a
means to realize the debtor's unpaid obligation pending sale, liquidation, or other disposition of the property, without incurring liability under CERCLA
Section [9607(a)(1)]. 15 4
Additionally, to demonstrate that it holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest, a lender need only list the property
with an appropriate agent within twelve months after foreclosure and
advertise the property as being for sale or disposition on a monthly basis
thereafter. 155 Moreover, the lender remains protected from liability by the
secured creditor exemption during this period unless it rejects, or fails to
act within 90 days upon receipt of, "a written, bona fide, firm offer of fair
151. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
152. " 'Fair consideration' refers to an amount, taking into consideration the terms and
conditions of the offer, that represents a value equal to or greater than the outstanding obligation of the debtor, as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b)(ii)." Lender Liability, supra note 19,
at 28,808-09.
153. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
154. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
155. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808. The property must be listed with a "broker,
dealer, or agent who deals with the type of property in question," and must also be advertised for sale or disposition on at least a monthly basis in either a real estate publication, or a
trade or other publication suitable for the property in question, or a newspaper of general circulation (defined as one with a circulation over 10,000, or one suitable under any applicable
federal, state, or local rules of court for publication required by court order or rules of civil
procedure) covering the area where the property is located.
Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
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consideration for the property... from a ready, willing, and able purchaser who156demonstrates to the security holder's satisfaction the ability to
perform."
. Any threat of liability to lenders for holding indicia of ownership
for investment purposes is practically extinguished by the EPA's draft
rule. A secured creditor may foreclose on contaminated property and hold
title for months, or even years, under the guise of "protecting a security
interest" as long as the creditor complies with the rule's extremely lenient
guidelines for listing the property for sale. In fact, lenders may even be
encouraged to hold property as long as possible under the EPA's proposal.
The MarylandBank and Guidice courts expressed concern that if banks that
foreclose and take title to property are exempted from CERCLA liability,
"the federal government [will) shoulder the clean-up costs while the bank
of the improved land and a
... enjoy[s) a windfall by15the
7 increased value
possible sale at a profit."
Although the EPA's proposed interpretive rule makes it relatively
easy for a secured creditor to hold title to contaminated property almost
indefinitely without incurring liability for "protecting an investment," the
lender is at least required to accept offers of "fair consideration" for the
property. Outbidding or rejecting a written, bona fide, firm offer of fair
consideration will be considered evidence that the lender is not holding
indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest. 158 Consequently, the lender's activities would fall outside the protection of the
secured creditor exemption and subject the creditor to CERCLA liability.
But the EPA takes the "bite" out of this restriction by requiring the
prospective purchaser to demonstrate "to the security holder's satisfaction
the ability to perform."1 59 While seemingly prescribing that secured creditors must accept fair bids on contaminated property, the draft rule
shrewdly provides an escape route by giving lenders discretion to accept
or reject offers. Under the EPA's proposal, a creditor could conceivably
156. Lender Liability, supranote 19, at 28,809.
A "written, bona fide, firm offer" is a legally enforceable offer, including all
material terms of the transaction, from a ready, willing, and able purchaser ....
"Fair consideration" is an amount equal to or in excess of the sum of the outstanding principal owed to the holder, plus any unpaid interest and penalties (whether
arising before or after foreclosure), plus all reasonable and necessary costs, fees or
other charges incurred by the holder incident to foreclosure, retention, continuing
functioning of the enterprise, and sale of the property, less any amounts received
by the holder in connection with any partial disposition of the property or net revenues received as a result of continued functioning of the facility.
Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,808.
157. Guidice v. BFG ElectroplatingMfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556,563 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United
States v. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573,580 (D. Md. 1986).
158. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809.
159. Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809 (emphasis added).
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avoid CERCLA liability by simply claiming that a ready, willing, and able
buyer failed to adequately establish, to the lender's satisfaction, the ability
to fulfill the terms of the offer. The draft rule does not require a showing of
actual inability to perform on the part of the prospective purchaser; a security holder may reject an offer based solely on doubts about the buyer's
performance. Additionally, the proposed interpretive rule provides a sixmonth window following foreclosure during which lenders may reject or
ignore0 bona fide offers of fair consideration for the property for any rea16
son.
This "foreclosure loophole" 16 1 extends protection to lenders who
purchase contaminated property at a foreclosure sale that is unavailable to
other potentially responsible parties. While secured creditors may argue
that such protection is imperative to ensure that lenders recoup outstanding balances and other expenses that typically accompany a defaulted
loan, the EPA's proposal practically guarantees creditors a "no lose situation." If a purchaser submits an "acceptable" offer for the property at the
foreclosure sale, the lender recovers costs immediately. Conversely, if no
fair bids are offered at the sale, the lender may purchase the property and
hold title almost indefinitely until the "right deal" comes along. Either
way, the creditor wins. The EPA's draft rule does little more than pay lip
service to the notion of imposing liability on lenders who secure title to
property to protect an investment. Consequently, the federal government,
and ultimately the taxpayers, will bear the burden of clean-up costs while
secured creditors, reaping the benefits of increased property values and
profitable sales, laugh all the way to the bank.

CONCLUSION
The EPA's interpretive rule proposal may be a step toward resolving the secured creditor exemption quandary, but it is a step in the wrong
direction. Although the draft rule's language implies that the exemption is
designed to protect lenders from CERCLA "owner" liability, the absence
of an express limitation to that effect facilitates continued imprecision in
the application of the exemption to both "owners" and "operators." Moreover, the EPA's proposal undermines CERCLA's liability scheme by going
overboard in providing a "safe harbor" for secured creditors. By not
requiring lenders to conduct environmental inspections of a site before
160. Specifically, the draft rule prescribes that a "security holder retains [the secured creditor exemption] unless: [B] If at any time after six months following foreclosure the security
holder rejects, or does not act upon within 90 days of receipt of a written, bonafide, firm offer
of fair consideration for the property." Lender Liability, supra note 19, at 28,809 (emphasis
added).
161. Phillips, supranote 122, at 1160.
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financing an operation, the rule provides creditors a liability escape route
that is unavailable to nonlenders who fail to act reasonably after performing such inspections. Additionally, the EPA's proposal creates a "mirror
image" Fleet Factors standard that reflects the same inequities by defining
"participating in the management" so narrowly that lenders are allowed
to undertake activities that would subject other potentially responsible
parties to liability as "operators." However, the most disconcerting aspect
of the EPA's proposed rule is the "foreclosure loophole." By expanding the
range of activities creditors may engage in after purchasing contaminated
property at a foreclosure sale, the draft rule frustrates legislative intent
behind CERCLA by placing the burden of clean-up costs back on taxpayers' shoulders. The proposal is a lucky pair of "loaded dice" rolling in
favor of lending institutions. The blanket of immunity for secured creditors created by the EPA's interpretive rule is so at odds with CERCLA's liability scheme it suggests that the lender liability issue should be addressed
by Congress rather than a regulatory agency.
ADDENDUM
The final rule on lender liability under CERCLA was promulgated by publication in the Federal Register on April 29,1992.162 Although
the final version's language differs significantly from the proposed rule
signed on June 5,1991, the substance is esentially intact. It remains unclear
under the new rule whether the secured creditor exemption targets "owners" or "operators". 163 Moreover, although the final rule broadens the definition of "participation in management" by not requiring a lender's
activities to result in a release or threatened release of hazardous subengage in
stances, the definition is still so narrow that lenders may safely164
activities that would subject nonlenders to "operator" liability.
Finally, the "foreclosure loophole" continues to provide lenders
substantial protection against liability under CERCLA. lt 5 The EPA's final
rule therefore embodies the same weaknesses of the proposed rule as discussed in this Comment.
ROBIN A. GOBLE

162. Lender Liability Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 18344 (1992).
163. Id. at 18382.
164. Id. at 18383.

165. Id. at 18383-84.

